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ABSTRACT
This paper uses a VAR to investigate four possible explanations of the extended slump in
Japanese economic activity over the 1990s: the absence of bold and consistent fiscal stimulus; the
limited room for expansionary monetary policy due to a liquidity trap; overinvestment and debt
overhang; and disruption of financial intermediation. The results indicate that all of these factors
played a role, but that the major explanation is disruption in financial intermediation, largely operating
through the impact of changes in domestic asset prices on bank lending.
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A. Introduction
What explains the Japanese economic slump of the 1990s? This question has gained
increased importance with the economy’s recent plunge economy into recession. Before the
latest bout of weakness, many regarded the downturn in activity which followed the bursting
of the asset price bubble in 1991 as following a normal cyclical pattern, although somewhat
longer than usual due to the size of the asset deflation. In particular, the nascent signs of
economic expansion through much of 1996 and early 1997 appeared to confirm that the
economy was regaining its balance (albeit assisted by some demand shifting in anticipation of
the consumption tax hike in April 1997), and could be expected to recover steadily over the
next few years.
Rather than recovering, however, in 1997 the economy entered into its first recession
since the early 1970s. Combined with the earlier weakness, this means that Japan has now
been in a slump for almost eight years. Growth has averaged only ¾ percent per annum over
this period, and the output gap is estimated to have moved from plus 4½ percentage points of
potential output in late 1990 to minus 4½ percent by early 1998. This makes Japan’s current
situation the most serious economic slowdown experienced by any major industrial country
since the early 1950s. Furthermore, this slump has occurred despite significant counter-
cyclical policies, involving a considerable expansion in the fiscal deficit (largely through
packages aimed at fiscal expansion) and reducing the overnight call rate to its effective floor
in early 1999.- 2 -
Useful analysis of the Japanese economy is contained in the EPA’s annual Economic
2
Surveys of Japan.
The proximate causes of the initial slowdown in output in the early 1990s are
generally agreed. In mid-1989 the Bank of Japan started to raise interest rates so as to cool
the asset price inflation which had started in the mid-1980s. The tightening of monetary
policy pricked what was later identified as an asset price bubble, and stock and land prices
started falling rapidly. Just as the run up of asset prices in the upswing of the bubble had
encouraged domestic spending and driven the economy significantly above potential output,
so the collapse of asset prices lowered domestic demand and output, and the economy grew at
an annual rate of 1 percent or less through 1994.
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As the Japanese slowdown has turned from temporary slowdown to slump, however,
its causes have come under further scrutiny, and a number of competing hypotheses have
emerged. They fall into four main categories. The first is that the slump reflects inadequate
policy responses, particularly as regards fiscal expansion (Posen, 1998). Although the
Japanese government has unveiled a number of fiscal packages aimed at reviving the
economy over the 1990s, the argument goes, most of these packages contained limited
amounts of “real water” (i.e., measures which have a direct impact on activity). The main
exception was the September 1995 stimulus package, to which the economy responded
vigorously until the recovery was derailed by a switch to fiscal contraction in early 1997.- 3 -
See Keynes (1936) and Hicks (1937).
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Some have also pointed to demographic effects in this connection, with the aging population
4
depressing investment more than saving.
An alternative view, which focuses on monetary policy, holds that Japan is stuck in a
liquidity trap (Krugman, 1998).  Consumption is historically low in Japan, creating a high
3
structural saving rate, which was offset during the golden years by high investment. However,
a slowdown in anticipated growth has led to a sufficiently large imbalance between saving
and investment that the equilibrium real interest is now negative. The anti-inflationary
reputation of the Bank of Japan is sufficiently strong that expectations of future inflation are
low. As a result, despite record low nominal short- and long-term interest rates, the monetary
authorities are unable to reduce the real interest rate sufficiently far to bring the economy
back to full employment.
A third view holds that the slowdown reflects the low rate of return to capital due to
over investment (Ando, 1998). Japan is in a vicious cycle, in which past over investment is
reducing the rate of return on capital, which both lowers current investment and spurs saving,
as consumers fail to achieve their desired level of asset accumulation. The usual wealth
effects which cause cyclical downturns are being elongated by the inefficiency of the
corporate sector, exacerbated by significant corporate debt overhang which further reduces
the incentive to invest. In the absence of wealth-creating investment opportunities, the
economy will remain depressed.  This explanation gives primacy to wealth effects (largely
4- 4 -
See Borio (1995) for a cross country comparison of financial systems.
5
Bank capital is susceptible to changes in stock prices because banks typically hold large
6
amounts of stock in industrial companies. Kwon (1998) explores the relationship between
monetary policy, land prices, bank lending and output using a VAR.
See Ogawa et al (1994) and Ogawa and Suzuki (1998) for evidence on how land collateral
7
has affected investment by Japanese firms, Ogawa and Kitisaka (1998) for a discussion of the
determinants of bank lending, and Wescott (1995) for a discussion of the role of SMEs in the
economy.
through the stock market, as land prices have divergent effects on property owners and those
with no land).
A final view holds that the slump reflects problems with financial intermediation.
Banks play a much more important role in financial intermediation in Japan than in “Anglo-
Saxon” financial systems such as the United States or United Kingdom,  and are the main
5
providers of loans to small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). During the asset price
bubble, the banks lent large amounts of money to firms using land as collateral. With the
steady fall in land prices since the bursting of the asset price bubble, many of these loans
have stopped performing. The bubble in stock prices further exacerbated these effects by first
boosting and then reducing bank capital.  Lax accounting rules and a permissive regulatory
6
environment have allowed banks to survive, but with only limited ability to lend to
companies due to the competing needs of writing-off bad loans and maintaining capital
adequacy ratios.
7
These explanations are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, it would be unlikely that a
slowdown of the type being currently experienced in Japan had a single cause. However, each- 5 -
These explanations also correspond to the alternative explanations of the recovery by the
8
U.S. from the 1930s depression. The fiscal explanation, for example, is favored by Gordon
(1988), the liquidity trap by Romer (1992) while the role of financial intermediation is
discussed in Bernanke (1983). For a comparison of the role of banks and monetary policy in
the two periods, see Bordo, Ito and Iwaisako (1997).
explanation points to a different set of variables—fiscal, monetary, stock prices and land
prices plus bank loans—as the major factor explaining the current slump.
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This paper examines the reasons for the slowdown in activity in Japan empirically
using a vector-autoregression (VARs) involving the main competing explanations: fiscal
policy, monetary policy (including the exchange rate), domestic asset prices and lending to
the private sector. A VAR approach was chosen for a number of reasons. It allows the
variables underlying the alternative explanations to be incorporated into a single empirical
approach. For example, their impacts on output can be compared using the relevant impulse
response functions. In addition, estimating a system of equations allows interactions between
different variables to be examined, in particular the relationship between domestic asset
prices, lending, and output, as well as allowing changes in underlying behavior to be assessed
through examination of the residuals from individual equations. Finally, the historical role of
each variable can be examined using the decomposition of past movements in output implied
by the VAR.
B. Past trends
Before discussing more formal analysis of the causes of the slowdown in Japan in the
1990s, it may be useful to look at the underlying data for output and for domestic demand and- 6 -
The year 1980 was chosen as a start for the empirical analysis so as to ensure that there was
9
a significant period before the bubble economy of the mid-1980s, so that the extended cycle
in output since 1987 could be put in context. As discussed later in the text, extending the
period back to 1973 (thereby extending the data back into the golden period of exceptionally
vigorous Japanese economic growth, in which the underlying forces shaping the economy
probably somewhat different than they were subsequently) has little impact on the results.
The data for total domestic demand has a similar pattern, although the period before 1987
10
looks somewhat less buoyant.
its components over the period since 1980.  As can be seen in Chart 1, output has gone
9
through a number of cycles over the last two decades, following a relatively stable growth
path from 1980 through 1987, expanding rapidly through the next few years to 1991, and
then stagnating from then through early 1995. This is followed by a very limited recovery
through early 1997, and a renewed collapse in output which is still continuing.  The Chart
10
also shows the Fund’s estimate of potential output based upon a Cobb-Douglas production
function and the resulting path for the gap. The path shows the cyclical path of the economy
even more clearly, including the cyclical peaks in 1990/91 and 1997, and troughs in 1983,
1995, and the current downturn.
The advantage of correcting for potential output is that it provides a path for the
cyclical element in output, which is primarily affected by short-term factors such as changes
in aggregate demand. Given the prolonged stagnation of output in Japan, however, any
estimate of the path of potential output is highly uncertain. In the analysis, the Fund’s- 7 -
Rerunning the VAR using logarithms of the real variables rather than ratios to potential
11
output produced very similar results.
Each component of demand is measured in three ways; nominal spending as a percentage of
12
observed nominal GDP; real demand as a percentage of observed real GDP, which adjusts for
changes in relative prices over time; and real demand as a percentage of potential output,
(continued...)
estimate is used to deflate real series, but as the VAR is estimated in first difference form this
has very limited effects on the results.
11
The behavior of individual components of demand can also provide insight as to the
sources of the recent slowdown in demand. Chart 2 graphs paths of private consumption,
business investment, net exports, government consumption, government investment, and
residential investment, measured as a ratio to output. If the downturn in output during the
1990s largely reflects consumption, then one would assume that it reflected wealth effects of
some form, while weakness business investment would point more towards financial
intermediation. To aid comparison, movements in the three major components of demand
(private consumption, business investment, and net exports) are measured on the same scale.
Business investment is clearly the most cyclical element of demand since 1980,
increasing markedly as a percentage of GDP over the bubble years compared to the period
before or since. The underlying trend in investment is also significantly affected by
movements in relative prices, with nominal spending staying fairly constant as a ratio to
nominal GDP between the early 1980s and the later 1990s, but the corresponding ratio using
real values has increased significantly, reflecting a decline in the relative price of investment




which takes account of both relative prices and the cycle.
The fiscal variables are adjusted for the cycle using the Fund’s standard approach.
13
As is discussed further below, the results are not sensitive to alternative measures of
14
(continued...)
has been relatively stable as a ratio to GDP over the last two decades, fluctuating within a
relatively narrow range between 57 and 61 percent of GDP. The alternative calculations
illustrates this stability. Measured as a percentage of observed output, consumption is
relatively low over the bubble years, while it is relatively high as a percentage of potential
output, reflecting the fact that most of the variation is in the denominator rather than the
numerator.
C. Econometric Analysis
This section reports the results from VARs using output, two fiscal variables (the
structural general government deficit is divided into direct government spending and taxes
net transfers ), two monetary variables (the real short-term interest rate and the real exchange
13
rate), two domestic asset prices (real stock prices and real land prices), and financial
intermediation. (Data sources are provided in the appendix.) Financial intermediation is
measured as lending to the private sector by banks, public institutions, and capital markets.
As private bank lending turns out to be the most important component, representing over
70 percent of all lending and dominating quarter-to-quarter changes, this series will be simply





output to eliminate the trends caused by expanding supply, and logarithms were taken of
those variables with no clear unit of measurement (the real exchange rate, real stock prices,
real land prices, and real lending). In addition to a constant term, the VARs also included two
dummy variables aimed at capturing the short-term shifting of demand seen the quarter
before and after the introduction of the consumption tax in 1989 and the consumption tax
hike in April 1997, with each variable being designed so that the impact sums to zero over
time.
The first stage in the analysis involved investigating the statistical properties of the
underlying series. The output gap is shown in Chart 1, while those of the other explanatory
variables are shown in Chart 3. Even though most of the series are adjusted by potential
output, many still appear nonstationary, with no tendency to revert to an underlying mean
value or trend. This even appears to be true of the output gap, despite the fact that output
should at some point revert to its level of potential. This presumably reflects the depth of the
current recession, which makes it appear that deviations from trend can be permanent.
Formal analysis confirms these visual impressions. Table 1 shows the results from
running Dickey-Fuller tests on the various components of the VARs. Almost all of the
variables, including the output gap, fail to accept stationarity (without the inclusion of a time
trend). Even the two exceptions, bank lending and taxes net of transfers, fail the test when a
time trend is included, spectacularly so in the case of real lending. When the variables are- 10 -
It remains possible that there are cointegrating relationships between the levels of the
15
variables. The Johansen (1991) procedure (which is not robust to small samples) indicated
many cointegrating relationships, but none with particularly intuitive properties. When the
VAR was estimated in levels terms, the estimated cointegrating relationships were generally
unsatisfactory, and the impulse responses from this system exhibited considerable cycling
and instability. Accordingly, it was decided to focus upon VARs using only first-differences,
which has the additional advantage that the constant terms act as trends, making the
estimation less dependent on the assumptions made about the path of potential output.
The start date of 1981 reflects the need to accommodate transformations of the underlying
16
data and lags in the VAR.
first differenced, however, the opposite result holds true, with almost all of the variables
accepting stationarity.
15
Accordingly, a VAR involving the first difference of the output gap, the other
explanatory variables, a constant term, and dummy variables for the consumption tax changes
of 1989 and 1997 was estimated from the first quarter of 1981 to the first quarter of 1998.
16
Two lags were used in the estimation as this was the lag length indicated by the Akaike
Information Criterion. A Choleski decomposition was used to orthogonalize the underlying
errors using the ordering: direct government spending; taxes net of transfers; the output gap;
the real exchange rate; the real exchange rate; real stock prices; real land prices; and real bank
lending. The ordering determines the level of exogeneity of the variables, with changes in
government spending being assumed independent of all other explanatory variables, while
current changes in bank lending are assumed to be affected by changes in all of the other
explanatory variables. The ordering was chosen on the basis of the speed with which the
variables respond to current events, with fiscal variables assumed to be the least responsive,
followed by output, then monetary policy, asset prices, and bank lending.- 11 -
Note that these responses refer to the level of output, etc. As the model was estimated in
17
first differences, underlying disturbances can result in permanent changes in the underlying
variables.
This is achieved through measuring the variable in logarithms, as a ratio to potential output
18
or, in the case of the real interest rate, by dividing the percentage value by 100.
These estimates are significantly smaller than the multipliers produced from large models
19
(the Fund, for example, uses a multiplier of 1–1.2 in its analysis, see Lipworth and Meredith,
1998).
Bayoumi (1998) discussed various reasons how the implementation of fiscal stimulus may
20
have muted its effects over the 1990s in more detail.
The estimated impulse responses for output, shown in Chart 4, are generally
intuitive.  The top left panel of Chart 4a, for example, reports the impulse response of the
17
level of output to a one standard deviation shock in direct government spending, together
with the level response of direct government spending to its own shock (all of the variables
are measured in such a manner that a change of 0.01 represents a 1 percent changes in the
relevant variable ). An increase in direct government spending provides the expected
18
temporary boost to the economy while an increase in taxes lowers activity. The dynamic
multiplier for direct government spending, calculated using the ratio between the response of
output and the response of government investment, indicates that in the short-term a ¥100
increase in government spending raises output by about ¥65.  The implied multiplier from a
19
tax increase, which peaks at -0.2 (in absolute value ) after two quarters, is again quite small.
20
In short, while fiscal policy is effective in stimulating output, the estimated impact is
relatively muted.- 12 -
When the real interest rate was divided into the nominal rate and inflation, it was found that
21
each component was correctly signed and contributed about one-half to the estimated impact.
An increase in the real interest rate of 1 percentage point lowers output by about
0.6 percent. This is consistent with, although at the lower end of, the wide range of estimates
from large models (see Krugman, 1998).  An increase in the real exchange rate also lowers
21
output in the short-term, although the effect is quite small—a 10 percent increase in the real
exchange rate lowering output by about 0.2 percent, reflecting the relatively closed nature of
the Japanese economy. Output rises in response to an increase in the real price of land and, to
a rather lesser extent, to increase in the price of stocks. Notably, it also rises quite
significantly in response to an increase in bank lending, with a 3 percent increase in such
lending leading to a 1 percent rise in output. The absolute size of the various impulse
response functions is also illuminating, as they illustrate the impact of a “typical” disturbance
in each variable on output. The largest response is associated with land prices, where a
typical quarterly disturbance changes output by about 1 percent over time, compared to a
value of 0.3 percent for real interest rates.
Chart 4b reports the standard errors around the responses of output (calculated using
Monte Carlo methods using 500 replications), which indicate that the short-term responses
are reasonably well identified. Over longer periods, however, the degree of precision
deteriorates, reflecting the fact that because the underlying impulse responses are cumulated
over time uncertainty is compounded.- 13 -
Tests indicate that the results are relatively invariant to alternative orderings of most
of the variables. However, this is not the case for the relative position of land prices to stock
prices or to bank lending, because of a significant colinearity between the residuals. If land
prices are placed after the other two variables in the ordering, the estimated long-term impact
on output becomes relatively similar across all three variables. The ordering chosen was the
felt to be the most “reasonable,” in that land prices are the least likely variable to be
immediately affected by other developments. The nexus of domestic asset prices and bank
lending is discussed further below.
To this point, the analysis has focused on the output responses implied by the system.
It is also of interest to examine the most important interrelationships between the individual
equations comprising the VAR, as these provide information as to the transmission
mechanisms at work. These interrelationships can be analyzed through F-tests of the
significance of each variable in each equation (i.e., Granger causality tests). The results from
this exercise again accord with intuition. Output is most affected by past changes in real
interest rates (note that the main impact of direct government spending is contemporaneous,
as government consumption and investment feed through directly into GDP), and least
affected by own shocks and real stock prices. Fiscal policy and the real interest rate are
relatively independent of the other variables in the model, indicating that government policy
decisions are made relatively autonomously, while the real exchange rate is also largely
independent of the rest of the model.- 14 -
Kwon (1998), also using a VAR approach, finds that collateral effect increase the impact of
22
monetary policy on the economy, but does not explore the wider set of interactions examined
in this paper. Lincoln (1998) provides a detailed discussion of the Japanese system of
financial intermediation.
Reversing the ordering of land and stock prices in the VAR leads to a fall of about three-
23
(continued...)
By contrast, there are important interactions are between stock prices, land prices, and
bank lending. As can be seen from the impulse responses in Chart 5, positive disturbances in
any one of these variables produces increases in all of them. This mutually reinforcing
interaction, which helps explain the asset bubble of the late 1980s, reflects, at least in part,
the importance of domestic asset prices in the behavior of banks, with land being used as the
most usual form of collateral, and share-holdings being an important source of bank capital.
22
In the 1990s, this process apparently went into reverse, hurting the economy through a
reinforcing erosion of bank collateral, capital, and loans (called, by some of the more
melodramatic commentators, the Japanese “death spiral”).
The importance of these interactions can be examined by rerunning the VAR with one
of the variables exogenized. This is done by excluding the chosen variable from the VAR, but
including its first two lags as exogenous variables. The estimated equations for the remaining
variables are identical to the main case, but any interactions involving the exogenized
variable are no longer identified. When bank lending is exogenized in this manner, the
impulse response of land price on output is lowered by almost 90 percent while the impulse
response of stock prices falls by two thirds, implying that the vast majority of the estimated




quarters in both impulse responses. Changing the order of bank lending relative to the two
asset prices had little impact on the results.
As already noted, there is also a contemporaneous relationship, with the size of the impulse
24
responses depending on the ordering of the variables.
prices and stock prices in a similar manner also produces significant, if somewhat less
spectacular, reductions in the impulse responses of the remaining financial variables with
respect to output. In short, there appears to be a close and highly interwoven interrelationship
between domestic asset prices and bank lending, an interrelationship which helps to explain
the size and longevity of the estimated effects of each of these variables on output.
24
The cumulated residuals from each equation, shown in Chart 6, help to illustrate the
direction of the underlying shocks (assuming the shocks are random, they should cumulate to
random walks, which have apparent trends over time). In addition to illustrating policy
changes (such as the spike in government spending after the September 1995 stimulus
package was announced and the tightening of monetary policy in late 1989), the results also
illustrate the rise and fall in domestic asset prices over the bubble and subsequent crash, the
increase in bank lending in the early 1980s (a time of significant deregulation) and more
recent weakness, and the large positive shocks to output in 1996, prior to the consumption tax
hike.
The decomposition of past movements in output implied by the model are shown in
Chart 7. Past changes in the output gap are divided into those parts explained by innovations
in fiscal policy (the sum of direct government spending and taxes net of transfers), monetary- 16 -
policy (the sum of real interest rates and the real exchange rate), asset prices (the sum of land
prices and share prices), bank lending, and exogenous disturbances (the sum of independent
shocks to output, the dummy variables, and any effects due to unidentified disturbances prior
to the estimation period).
The decomposition indicates that the most important factor explaining past
movements in output is innovations in asset prices, accounting for most of the hump in the
output gap over the bubble period and subsequent weakness. Changes in bank lending helps
to explain the rise in output in the early- to mid-1980s and more recent weakness in activity,
indicating that shocks to bank lending can also generate significant movements in output.
Monetary policy was supportive though the bubble period, restrictive through much of the
1990s, and more recently again providing a significant boost to the economy. Fiscal policy
provided a significant boost to the economy in the 1995 and early 1996, but this support was
rapidly withdrawn in the later part of 1996. While exogenous factors play an important role in
explaining quarter-to-quarter variation in output, they only matter for overall movements in
output over the more recent period.
Chart 7b decomposes the aggregate fiscal, monetary, asset price and exogenous
effects into their constituent parts (in the case of fiscal policy, for example, the effects of
direct government spending and taxes net of transfers are distinguished). They indicate that
the fiscal expansion of 1996 was largely fueled by direct government spending, reflecting the
sharp increase and subsequent fall in government investment, changes in real interest rates
have been the most important monetary policy effect, and that changes in land prices have- 17 -
When the ordering of land and stock prices in the VAR is reversed, the impact of stock
25
prices increases, but still only accounts for a variation in the output gap of around
1 percentage point of GDP over the 1990s.
been generally more important than stock prices in explaining movements in output. Also
note the significant role played by own shocks in the increase output in late 1996 and early
1997, presumably reflecting longer-term demand shifting from the consumption tax hike than
that captured by the existing dummy variable, particularly in residential investment (Chart 2).
The historical decomposition also has implications for the differing explanations for
the mini-revival of output in 1996. The results shown in Chart 7 indicate that fiscal policy
and monetary policy both contributed, each providing a boost of about 1 percent to output.
However, the underlying situation appears to have started worsening in late 1996 (in part due
to a sharp fall in public investment), weakness which was obscured by demand shifting in
anticipation of the consumption tax hike.
The importance of bank lending as a conduit for asset price effects is illustrated in
Chart 8, which graphs the estimated impact of land prices and stock prices on output once
bank lending has been exogenized as described earlier. In this experiment, asset prices
produce very limited movements in output, indicating that the “pure” effects of changes in
wealth are quite limited.  A comparison of Charts 7 and 8 vividly illustrates the central role
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played by financial intermediation in transmitting asset price shocks to the real economy.
To examine the robustness of the model, the VAR was reestimated under a number of
alternative assumptions. The lag length of the VAR was extended from two lags to three lags,
which produced very similar results (with more complex impulse responses). Next, the- 18 -
impact of changing the estimation period was examined, both by truncating the sample at the
first quarter of 1996 to avoid the distortions associated with the consumption tax hike in
1997, and by extending the estimation period back to 1973. The VAR was rerun using
nominal variables instead of their real equivalents, to examine whether nominal asset price
changes produce a more significant impact on the model. Finally, experiments using different
proxies for financial intermediation (restricting the variable to cover only bank lending or
only lending to the corporate sector) were also conducted. None of these experiments
changed the qualitative nature of the results.
In another type of experiment, additional variables were included in the estimation.
First, the old-age dependency ratio was added to the VAR, in order to examine the role of
demographic changes in explaining the bubble and subsequent slump. Demographic changes
were found to increase output by about ½ percent over the 1980s and lower it by the same
amount over the 1990s. At least some of this effect comes through asset prices, in that
increases in the old-age dependency ratio were found to lower domestic stock and land
prices, presumably reflecting the reduced demand for such assets from older individuals. The
impact on the remainder of the model was minimal. Next, the capital stock was also added to
the VAR, so as to see if a direct measure of overinvestment (the ratio of the capital stock to
potential output) helps to explain past changes in output. This variable also had minimal
effects either on output or the rest of the model. Finally, real narrow money (M1) was
substituted for the real interest rate, to see if a different measure of monetary policy had a- 19 -
Like output, these variables were normalized by dividing by potential output.
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significant effect on the results. The money supply provides a good substitute for the real
interest rates within the estimation, but has very little impact on the other impulse responses. 
An alternative way of examining the robustness of the results is to consider what
happens when variables other than output are used in the VAR. In particular, if the
conclusions from this analysis are valid, one would expect that same types of patterns found
for output to be apparent in an analysis using the major components of aggregate demand.
Accordingly, the VAR was reestimated three times, with output each time being replaced by
a different major component of demand (private consumption, business fixed investment, and
residential investment).
26
The estimated impulse responses for each component of demand are shown in
Chart 9. The impulse response functions for output from the various shocks appear generally
sensible. Increases in government direct spending crowd out private consumption and
business investment, but crowd in residential investment, which is what might be expected
given the concentration in government investment projections on infrastructure projects of
doubtful overall efficiency. Increases in taxes and interest rates lower all of the components
of demand, again as might be expected, while the impact of the real exchange rate on
domestic demand is small. Finally, increases in stock prices, land prices, and bank loans all
raise demand.
The decomposition of historical movements in private consumption, business
investment, and residential investment can be seen in Chart 10. The dominant factor- 20 -
explaining movements in business investment and consumption has been asset prices while
residential investment has been largely affected by bank loans, partly offset by expansionary
fiscal policy, plausibly reflecting higher government investment (the panels are all produced
on the same scale to aid comparisons across different components). Further analysis (not
reported) indicates that land prices continue to be at least as important as share prices in
explaining the behavior of output, and that bank lending remains an important channel for
asset price movements. Hence, the analysis of the components of demand broadly confirms
the conclusions of the original analysis.
D. Conclusions
This paper has examined the reasons for the marked slowing of growth in Japan in the
1990s in the context of a VAR analysis which includes the impact of fiscal policy, monetary
policy, domestic asset prices, and bank loans. The results are used to attempt to differentiate
between a number of alternative explanations of the current slump, including the absence of
bold and consistent fiscal stimulus, the limited room for expansionary monetary policy due to
a liquidity trap, asset deflation operating through the long-term problems caused by
overinvestment, inadequate returns on saving and debt overhang, and disruption of financial
intermediation.
The results indicate that all of these explanations have some validity. Fiscal policy has
generated limited effect on output except in the wake of the September 1995 stimulus
package, whose beneficial effects were rapidly reversed by an abrupt shift to fiscal- 21 -
contraction. Expansionary monetary policy is also found to be effective in stimulating
demand recently, but has presumably reached its practical limit given the low level of interest
rates and deflationary pressures. Domestic asset price changes were an important factor
behind the rise in the output gap over the bubble period and the subsequent decline.
However, the important role assigned to land prices appears inconsistent with explanations
which emphasize pure wealth effects as an explanation of the slump (changes in land prices
have different effects on individuals depending on whether they own land or not), or with
explanations which emphasize structural problems caused by declining rates of return on
reproducible capital.
What the analysis reveals is the central role played by financial intermediation in
magnifying the impact of asset prices on the economy. Increases in bank lending, operating
both directly and through a self-reinforcing cycle with increases in land prices (the main
source of collateral) and stock prices (an important component of bank capital), helps explain
much of the expansion in the output gap in the mid- to late-1980s. The reverse process
operated with equal force over the contraction, as undercapitalized banks responded to falling
asset prices and other balance sheet pressures by restraining lending to maintain capital
adequacy standards.
The importance of banks both in overall lending and, in particular, in providing
capital to smaller companies, who have failed to provide their usual role in leading the
economy out of recession, provides an obvious mechanism through which domestic asset
prices and bank lending could have disrupted activity. The central role played by financial- 22 -
intermediation in the slump also provides a compelling reason for the limited effectiveness of
standard macroeconomic policies. If the corporate sector is limited in its ability to obtain
funds, then this will blunt the impact of monetary policy (as such policy operates largely
through the banking system) and of fiscal policy (as companies and individuals will be
constrained in their ability to respond to government stimulus). Finally, it provides a ready
explanation for the current recession. Already undercapitalized banks responded to prospect
of tighter banking regulations in early 1998 (when “prompt corrective action” was
introduced) by further cutting back on lending, exacerbating the weakness already generated
by fiscal contraction and the Asia crisis, and sending the economy rapidly into the doldrums.
At the same time, the limitations of this exercise should be borne in mind. VAR
analysis is a powerful tool, but it assumes that the underlying responses are linear and have
not changed over time. Both assumptions could be questioned in the context of the type of
slump currently being experienced in Japan. Individuals could react differently to events
depending on the state of the macroeconomy, with behavior at the tip of a cyclical upturn
being rather different from that at the bottom of a downturn. Similarly, the impact of financial
sector deregulation since 1980 may have altered the relationship between the corporate sector
and the banking system. More analysis, looking more deeply at the mechanisms through
which the banking system might affect output would be needed to support the results from
this paper. However, the fact that these results appear robust across a number of different
specifications provides at least some evidence that banking system problems are indeed at the
heart of the current weakness in activity.- 23 -
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Table 1. Dickey-Fuller Tests Results
                                                                                     Level               
                                                                     No trend                Trend             First difference   Second difference 
Output 0.80 0.95 0.00 0.00
Direct government spending 0.25 0.76 0.00 0.00
Taxes net of transfers 0.03 0.11 0.00 0.00
Real interest rate 0.55 0.07 0.00 0.00
Real exchange rate 0.76 0.84 0.00 0.00
Real land prices 0.62 1.00 0.43 0.00
Real stock prices 0.51 0.96 0.00 0.00
Real bank lending 0.05 1.00 0.00 0.00
Memorandum items:
Private consumption 0.38 0.63 0.00 0.00
Business investment 0.79 0.98 0.00 0.00
Residential investment 0.48 0.82 0.00 0.00
Source: Authors calculations.26272829303132333435363738- 39 -
Appendix: Data Sources
The sources for the variables were as follows:
Output and Components of Demand. The National Income Accounts.
Direct Government Spending: The sum of real quarterly government consumption and public
investment.
Taxes Net of Transfers: Nominal seasonally unadjusted quarterly general government deficit
(defined from its components) less (unadjusted) direct government spending. As the series
were not seasonally adjusted and tax policy normally occurs on an annual basis, the series
used in the regressions was the four quarter moving average, first differences by subtracting
the same value from the year before. Projected after 1997Q1 due to lack of data.
The Real Interest Rate: The 3-month gensaki rate less the inflation rate of the GDP deflator
(adjusted for indirect tax changes) over the previous 4 quarters.
The Real Exchange Rate: The Fund’s multilateral real exchange rate calculated using data on
unit labor costs across developing countries.
Real Stock Prices. Monthly averages of the Nikkei 225 index, divided by the GDP deflator.
Real Land Prices: Semi annual data on the average value of land in the 6 major cities were
interpolated, and divided by the GDP deflator.
Real Loans: The sum of liabilities of the corporate sector and borrowing by the private sector,
as measured by the flow of funds accounts, divided by the GDP deflator.